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Abstract 
Examines the 1994 presidential election as a way to comprehend the scope and 
pace of Mexican democratization and to derive general lessons about democratic 
reforms. Brief review of the reforms and accords reached in 1994 and an analysis of 
their impact; Difference of the 1994 presidential election from its predecessors; 
Implications of the 1994 presidential election on the debate over Mexican 
democratization. 
 
 
 
Article 
 
The 1994 presidential election presents a paradox for students of Mexican politics in 
particular and democratization in general. The year witnessed many numerous and 
far-reaching changes, both planned and unplanned. An uprising in the state of 
Chiapas; the assassination of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio; a sweeping electoral reform; and a hotly contested 
presidential race marked the unprecedented year in Mexican politics. The election 
results, however, were the same as in every previous presidential election for more 
than sixty years: a victory by the PRI candidate, in this case Ernesto Zedillo Ponce 
de Leon. How to explain this? What significance does the outcome have for 
understanding the process of regime democratization? 
 
This article examines the 1994 presidential election as a way to comprehend the 
scope and pace of Mexican democratization and to derive general lessons about 
democratic reforms. It begins with brief review of the reforms and accords reached in 
1994 and an analysis of their impact. Then it turns to the question of who voted for 
Zedillo and why. Was the outcome a result of massive fraud? Did voters turn to the 
PRI out of fear or conservatism? Even more important is the question of fundamental 
change: how different was the presidential election of 1994 from its most recent 
predecessor, that of 1988? Was this latest round of electoral competition merely 
more of the same campaign practices and voter behavior, or were Mexican politics 
transformed? If important distinctions between 1988 and 1994 are to be made, what 
do they signify for the future of Mexico and the prospects for democratization there? 
Finally, does Mexico's experience offer any insight into the process of 
democratization in general? 
 
Often it is hard to assimilate the case of Mexico into the literature on democratic 
transitions and consolidations. Mexico's status as an exception to the hemisphere's 
prevailing bureaucratic authoritarianism of the 1960s and 1970s caused its 
continuing deviation from the democratic trends of the 1980s and 1990s. Single, 
transformative events, such as the 1989 Chilean plebiscite, are missing from the 
Mexican experience. Early academic work in the area of democratic transitions (such 
as Schmitter and O'Donnell 1986) primarily focused on the transformation from 
military to civilian regimes. For Mexico, however, democratization has not meant 
replacing military leaders with civilians; rather, efforts have centered on limiting the 
power of the PRI and creating a genuine multiparty, competi- tive political system. 
Given this distinction, much of the scholarly work based on Southern Cone 
experiences is not applicable to Mexico. 
 
Later research (such as Tulchin 1995 and Camp 1996) examines democratic 
consolidation, the deepening of elected civilian rule, and the travails of avoiding an 
authoritarian backslide. Given the PRI's continued dominance and persistent 
concerns about the validity of the electoral process in Mexico, discussions about 
creating political organizations, power sharing with the military, and other 
commonplace issues for many Latin American countries do not concern Mexico to 
the same degree. Thus the case of Mexico must continue to be treated as a type of 
"outlier" to the overall pattern of Latin American democratization. 
 
In Mexico, limits on the power of the PRI have come from challenges at the state 
level. Opposition victories-first in municipalities, then in statewide contests-have 
come slowly but steadily. For example, before the July 1997 elections, approximately 
37 percent of Mexico was governed by the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN). Party 
members controlled four governorships and 247 municipalities (Christian Science 
Monitor 1996). Members of the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) also 
governed various cities. If democratization in Mexico is signaled by electoral 
competition and opposition control over power, then that process has occurred at the 
local rather than the national level. 
 
This essay contends that the 1994 presidential election had profound implications for 
the debate over Mexican democratization. That election offers three important 
lessons. First and foremost, the election and its results destroyed certain basic 
assumptions about Mexico and Mexican democratization; closely held "truths" about 
Mexican electoral politics were proven false. For example, a high voter turnout-often 
thought to be detrimental to the PRI-did not lead to an opposition victory. Similarly, 
the 1994 elections proved that electoral credibility could be achieved without a loss 
by the PRI and that the PRI could win without resorting to widespread ballot box 
tampering. 
 
Second, the 1994 election reaffirms the lesson that commonly adhered-to concepts 
about political transitions do not really apply in the case of Mexico. Scholars usually 
look for sudden, dramatic change in regime type, normally signaled by change at the 
national executive level, as evidence of a political transition. Political change in 
Mexico has been- and will most likely continue to be-a protracted process taking 
place on the state rather than the national level. Even though the PRI continued its 
monopoly on the presidency, important political changes in terms of electoral reforms 
and results did take place. The evolutionary process of Mexican democratization 
continued. 
 
The third lesson of the 1994 presidential election is especially significant. The 
election-particularly in light of what occurred in the subsequent year-revealed that 
the context of elections is as important as the vote count. Efforts at democratization 
cannot concentrate exclusively on limiting fraud. Other elements, such as the 
political environment, access to media coverage, and financial resources, are equally 
vital for successful democratization.  
 
A review of the 1994 Mexican presidential election uncovers aspects of both change 
and continuity. Reforms were put into place that changed the procedures governing 
elections. The context in which elections took place, however-of which the most 
important element was the merging of the PRI and the government-did not change. 
The 1994 elections saw little overt fraud; this was a dramatic change from the 
election of 1988. Yet the PRI candidate won, an outcome that has not changed since 
1930. The 1994 elections witnessed the growth of the PAN as a national opposition 
force, a notable change from previous years. But the 1994 elections also evidenced 
the continued dominance of the PRI. While many elements in Mexico changed, 
many stayed the same. This combination of change and continuity, though, fits the 
evolutionary pattern of Mexican democratization.  
 
 
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE: THE REFORMS OF 1994 
 
The two official electoral reforms of 1994 marked the third and fourth times during 
the sexenio of Carlos Salinas de Gortari that the rules and procedures governing 
elections were changed. The Salinas government, entering office in 1988 under a 
cloud of accusations about massive electoral fraud, had pledged to reform the 
process. 
 
Several aspects of the pre-1994 electoral reforms are noteworthy. In 1990, the 
government created a new method to prevent repeated electoral voting by 
developing a voter identification card with a photo. The same reform legislation 
adopted a new Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE) and 
established a Federal Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal de Elecciones, IFE) to 
oversee federal elections. Among the tasks assigned to the IFE were to develop a 
new voter registration list and to issue the new voter identification cards. In 1993, 
again under pressure to improve the quality of Mexican elections, the government 
adopted a number of additional measures. The Senate was expanded to include 
proportional representation seats; the Chamber of Deputies was relieved of the duty 
of verifying its own election returns; the IFE was expanded to include a Federal 
Electoral Tribunal to decide election controversies; reforms of political parties' 
finances were introduced; and limits on campaign spending were established. By the 
end of 1993, as the presidential campaigns were set to begin, no one anticipated any 
further changes in the federal election code. Before the August 21,1994 elections, 
though, two subsequent reforms of electoral rules and procedures would appear. 
 
The unanticipated changes in 1994 came in response to unantici- pated events. The 
January 1, 1994 uprising by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) 
and the March 23, 1994 assassination of Colosio sparked renewed concerns about 
peaceful mechanisms for political change, primarily the scheduled presidential 
elections. In the words of Jorge Carpizo, secretary of gobemaci6n (government) and 
president of the General Council of the IFE, it was necessary that "the federal 
elections of 1994 be impartial, credible, objective, and acceptable for the society and 
political organizations" (LaJornada 1994b, 1). 
 
This concern was echoed by civil society in Mexico. Shortly after the rebellion in 
Chiapas began, "20 Compromisos por la democracia," a document signed by 675 
prominent citizens, appeared in numerous newspapers and magazines. A 
spokesman for the group,Jose Agustin Ortiz Pincheti, said that the document was a 
call for the government and political parties to respond to the unraveling situation in 
the nation. 
 
The oldest justification of the authoritarian system was its capacity for 
maintaining peace; today ... that certainty has been destroyed. The rebellion 
in Los Altos de Chiapas, with strong local, agrarian, and radical 
characteristics, is a sign of advanced social decomposition and the fraying of 
national politics ... it is the lack of liberty and democracy, electoral abuses and 
manipulation that may provoke the extension of the Chiapas rebellion to the 
entire country. (LaJornada 1994a, 1) 
 
Thus the EZLN uprising provided strong motives for a reformulation of election rules 
and procedures: belief that the 1994 presidential elections would be free and fair was 
essential to halt the spread of political violence and antisystem responses to political 
adversity. 
 
Concern about world opinion also spurred change. President Salinas was engaged 
in a campaign to win the presidency of the World Trade Organization, the recently 
created successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In an effort to 
secure for himself an important post- Mexican presidency job, Salinas had to present 
the picture of a successful, trustworthy, modern administrator. Transparent 
presidential elections without any controversy were a key ingredient in maintaining 
this image. 
 
The "20 Compromisos por la democracia" provided the basis for the "Acuerdo por la 
paz, la democracia y la justicia," signed by the main political parties. The accord 
called for certain measures to ensure an impartial election: 
 
* Impartiality of election authorities  
* An external audit of the voter registration list to ensure public confidence  
* Guarantees of equal coverage in the mass media  
*An end to the use of resources and public programs to favor a political party 
or campaign  
* A revision of political party funding  
* A review of recent changes to the penal code that could infringe on political 
rights 
*An exploration by the attorney general of the possibility of naming a special 
prosecutor for electoral crimes  
* The consideration and adoption of these measures by a special session of 
the Congress before the 1994 elections (Cited in Mendez and Bolivar 1995, 
table 9, p. 40) 
 
The last two electoral reforms of Salinas's administration began with a special 
session of the Mexican congress, initiated in March. The need for increased 
credibility and the pressure to pursue peaceful means of political change became 
more urgent with the assassination of Colosio on March 23. The political adversity 
Mexico was facing required the establishment of "stability resting on a new basis: 
foundations that ... are democratic, civilized, civic, and completely legal" (Aguilar 
Camin et al. 1994, 39). More than ever, transparent elections were essential. 
 
The third electoral reform contained three key points. Following suggestions set forth 
in the Acuerdo, it allowed, for the first time, accredited national observers and foreign 
visitors to review and report on the elections. It also authorized a special prosecutor 
for electoral crimes and funded an external audit of the voter registration list. All 
these actions, it was hoped, would strengthen the impartiality of the elections and 
limit the opportunity for electoral fraud. 
 
In May 1994, continuing concern about legality and credibility provoked the 
enactment of a fourth electoral reform. This legislation focused on the IFE. 
Responding to the request for impartial election authorities, the congress 
reorganized the central electoral institution, the IFE, by increasing the presence and 
importance of citizens unaffiliated with the government or political parties. This 
reorganization affected not only the highest levels of the IFE but the entire 
apparatus. As table 1 outlines, the main organ of the IFE, the General Council, was 
completely transformed. 
 
The General Council previously had 21 voting members, most of whom-because of 
PRI domination of Congress and the executive branch-were members of the PRI. 
They enjoyed not only a guarantee of two members of the legislative contingent and 
the presidency of the IFE itself but also a majority vote in the political party 
contingent. Under its old organization, the General Council only had minority 
participation by unaffiliated citizens. The reorganization, by decreasing the number of 
voting participants, resulted in the domination of unaffiliated participants, who now 
enjoyed a 54.5 percent voting majority. 
 
This reorganization and "citizenization" also occurred at the state and district levels. 
The IFE includes 32 "local" councils (one per state) and 300 "district" councils (one 
per Chamber of Deputies district). Local councils were composed of two members of 
the state IFE organization, six citizens (designated by the IFE General Council), and 
equal participation (voice but no vote) for each registered political party. District 
councils had two members from the district IFE, six citizens (designated by the 
appropriate IFE local council), and equal participation (voice but no vote) for each 
registered political party. 
 
The precinct organization was also changed. Mexico has 96,000 voting precincts 
(casillas); each precinct has four officials, with alternates. These officials are in 
charge of setting up the voting area, supervising the casting of votes, counting 
precinct votes, and sending results (and ballots) to the district offices. The four 
officials (president, secretary, first and second examiners) were randomly selected 
by lottery. To qualify, one had to be a resident of the precinct, be a registered voter, 
have a voter identification card, "have an honest mode of living," take a series of 
courses given by the district IFE, not be a public official or an official of any political 
party, know how to read and write, and be less than 70 years old the day of the 
election (IFE 1994).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A whole network of people and mechanisms was installed to ensure that electoral 
fraud was not committed in the voting precincts. By law, precinct officials were 
observed by political party representatives, citizen observers, and foreign visitors. 
The 1994 elections also saw the introduction of transparent ballot boxes to 
guarantee that there would be no (presumedly PRI) prestuffing of the containers. An 
indelible ink was distributed for precinct officials to place on people's fingers after 
voting (Alcaraz Sanguino 1994). 
 
To counteract concern about pre-election day activities, steps were taken, 
sometimes outside the government, to create a more equitable environment during 
the campaign. For example, on June 18, 1994, responding to complaints from 
influential citizens, political parties, and the IFE General Council, the major television 
channels offered free air time to all nine political parties with registered presidential 
candidates. With rotating time slots, each of the nine parties had an opportunity to air 
three messages (without commercial interruption). This was intended to counter the 
perceived pro-PRI coverage by the mass media, particularly the major television 
networks. It was, however, a voluntary move on their part, not necessitated by any 
law or reform.  
 
It is intriguing, though, that most of the Acuerdo's suggested reforms relating to the 
electoral climate were not formally codified into either of the two legislative electoral 
reforms. The calls for legally mandated equal media access, a revision of party 
funding, and more stringent controls over public resources were not heeded. Overall, 
the 1994 reforms, though extensive, concentrated almost exclusively on "electoral 
transparency" and the prevention of ballot box fraud. 
 
EVALUATION OF THE REFORMS 
 
While the number of changes and their scope are impressive, a key concern is how 
well they worked in actuality. Were the electoral reform measures truly enacted, and 
did the government follow through? Of particular interest are four areas: the role of 
citizens on the General Council, citizen control at the state and district levels, the 
impartiality of the professional IFE staff, and citizen observation of election day 
activity. 
 
In terms of the "citizenization" of the highest level of IFE, the General Council, results 
were mixed. The citizens selected were universally praised for their impartiality and 
concern for free and fair elections. The citizen advisers, however, joined the General 
Council on June 3, 1994, only 11 weeks before the election. This clearly limited their 
influence because a number of decisions were taken before they joined the 
organization. 
 
Impartial citizen participation at state and district levels proved to be even more 
questionable. An investigation by Alianza Civica-Observacion 94, a 
nongovernmental organization, showed domination by PRIistas and public officials at 
these lower levels, thereby continuing the domination of the governing party and the 
government at the most immediate levels of voting and ballot tallying (Alianza 
Civica-Observaci6n 1994a, 5). 
 
Likewise, the trustworthiness of members of the IFE Secretariat was questioned. 
Given the long and close association between the government and the PRI, IFE staff 
members' avowals of nonbias were viewed with suspicion. Commentators who 
favored transparent elections noted that IFE personnel, as well as PRI party 
members, had to be considered partisans of the governing party (Grobet and 
Alvarado 1994). 
 
Of course, citizen observers were viewed as an additional guarantee against 
electoral fraud, and they were present in 285 of the 300 electoral districts. Coverage 
was therefore widespread but not complete. In terms of political party 
representatives, of the 96,000 precincts, 44 percent did not have any political party 
observers; 5 percent had representatives from one political party; and 51 percent 
had representatives from two or more (Mercado Gasca and Zuckermann Behar 
1994, 24-25). Therefore, at the lowest level of electoral organization, barely a 
majority of precincts enjoyed scrutiny by at least one opposition party. 
 
While the reforms passed by the government may not have been implemented as 
completely or fully as could be hoped, most assessments of the election day itself 
were positive. Overall, in urban zones, the elections were relatively clean. Because 
the majority of Mexican citizens live in urban areas, this was welcome news. About 
44 percent of the voting public lives in rural and semirural districts, however. In rural 
zones, especially in the south, "there were grave violations during the election" 
(Alianza Civica-Observacion 1994a), such as voter intimidation and repeated voting. 
Nevertheless, "it is probable that [these violations] did not alter the final results of the 
presidential election" (Alianza Civica-Observacion 1994a, 4). 
 
Such an assessment of election day contrasts greatly with that of the previous 
presidential election. Numerous irregularities were reported during the 1988 electoral 
process, such as multiple voting by the same person, stuffing the ballot boxes with 
extra ballots, and lost ballot boxes. The most notorious example was that the entire 
computer system run by the Ministry of Gobernacion to tally the votes "crashed" as 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, the opposition candidate, appeared to take the lead in the 
returns. When the system went back online, new data indicated a victory by PRI 
candidate Salinas (Barberan et al. 1988; Reding 1988). Thus, in comparison to 1988, 
voting in the 1994 presidential election was remark- ably transparent and without 
widespread problems. 
 
Still, evaluations of the overall 1994 election campaign are not so sanguine. Many 
commentators noted problems with the context or environment in which the elections 
were conducted. Two problematic areas often cited are media coverage and use of 
government resources. Neither of these was the subject of electoral reform before 
the 1994 presidential contest, and they are a different kind of issue than those that 
preoccupied most reformers. Yet the context of electoral competition clearly 
influenced the election results. 
 
An evaluation of media coverage depends on the individual medium considered. In 
terms of television, unequal coverage was more or less continuous. Positive 
coverage of the PRI was the norm. Complaints from opposition parties about 
coverage reported for the months of January through May prompted the IFE to 
request (but not legally require) more equitable television news reports. In June and 
July, television coverage improved. But in August-the time closest to the 
election-observers noted a return to unbalanced television coverage (Alianza Civica- 
Observaci6n 1994b, 2). 
 
 
 
Newspaper coverage of the presidential campaign differed slightly from that of 
television. As table 2 demonstrates, newspapers devoted significantly more space to 
the PRI than to the other political parties. Compared to the 1988 campaign, however, 
treatment was more equitable. Unlike television, furthermore, newspapers often 
included negative as well as positive reports on the PRI.  
 
It is important that newspaper coverage was better than in 1988, although still 
unequal. Television coverage, however, must be considered more significant, 
especially in a nation with high illiteracy or limited literacy rates. As is true for most 
nations in this modern age, television is often the single source of information for 
most citizens. 
 
Like media coverage, use of government resources by the "official party" during the 
1994 campaign season poisoned the competition between the political parties. In 
particular, use of public monies and services, such as those of Pronasol (Programa 
Nacional de Solidaridad) and Procampo (Programa para Apoyos Directos al 
Campo), created an unfair advantage for the PRI.1 Many stories circulated after the 
election about the use of these funds to inprove PRI electoral fortunes. For example, 
monitors from the organization Global Exchange in Tlapa, Guerrero, reported that 
the day before the 1994 presidential election, "the government agency, Procampo, 
was handing out checks for from [US]$100 to $200 to the local campesinos at the 
city hall. The campesinos were told that these subsidies would only continue if the 
PRI stayed in power" (BorderLines, 1994).  
 
Clearly, a fundamental obstacle to completely free and fair elections remained. 
Indeed, the problem of campaign financing persisted after the 1994 elections. For 
instance, the scandal that erupted in 1995 concerning the state elections in Tabasco 
highlights the central role played by unequal access to monetary resources.2 
Furthermore, revelations in 1995 about the use of foreign reserves to prop up the 
peso until after the 1994 presidential election also emphasize the importance of 
these more complex forms of manipulation and fraud that influence electoral results, 
albeit indirectly.3  In retrospect, the greatest and most telling flaws in the conduct of 
the 1994 presidential election were those surrounding the context of the election, not 
the vote counting. These are problems of a fundamentally different nature than the 
fraud attacked by the electoral reforms. Yet the importance of these types of 
electoral flaws becomes even more obvious after an examination of who voted for 
which candidate and why.  
 
WHO VOTED FOR ZEDILLO, AND WHY? 
 
The official results of the 1994 presidential election show that about 70 percent of the 
Mexican electorate participated in the voting on August 21. PRI candidate Ernesto 
Zedillo won 50.18 percent of the vote, followed by Diego Fernandez of the PAN with 
26.69 percent and Cuauhtemoc Cardenas of the PRD with 17.08 percent. These 
results somewhat parallel the percentages obtained in several pre-election polls. It is 
interesting that most of these surveys predicted a slightly smaller margin of victory 
for the PRI, with percentages in the 40s. Many commentators before the election 
discounted the opinion poll results, predicting that the public would not feel 
comfortable openly voicing an anticipated vote against the PRI. Contrary to the 
common belief, however, election day proved the surveys correct in their prediction 
of a PRI victory. This marked a new trend in Mexican politics: discounting the public 
opinion polls was no longer appropriate. 
 
This somewhat unanticipated electoral outcome focused new interest on the pro-PRI 
vote. If the reforms leading up to the August 1994 election were truly implemented, 
then why did Zedillo win? This query goes to the heart of a basic assumption that 
underlay much of the scholarly thinking about Mexican elections: PRI victories 
depended on ballot box fraud. Yet the evidence suggested that Zedillo's election 
could not be attributed to ballot box alchemy. Just who voted for Zedillo and why? 
Table 3 examines the party affiliation of presidential voters. 
 
As might be anticipated, voting patterns in the previous election well match those of 
the 1994 election. Thus, those who voted for Salinas were most likely to vote for 
Zedillo. Indeed, it appears that party loyalty was slightly stronger in the PRI than in 
the other two major parties. These findings are reinforced by additional data showing 
that PRI voters, by a large majority (65 percent), decided at the beginning of the 
campaign to vote for the same party as they had in the previous election. In contrast, 
only 35 percent of the PAN voters and 39 percent of the PRD voters decided on their 
vote at the very beginning of the electoral campaign (Mercado Gasca and 
Zuckermann Behar, 1994, 23). These figures indicate that party affiliation-and 
subsequent voting behavior-was a powerful force that worked in favor of the PRI. 
Thus the 1994 election data reinforced observations from the 1988 and 1991 
elections concerning party affiliation (Dominguez 1995). Given the preeminence of 
the PRI for more than 65 years, this represented a tremendously strong-and 
nonfraudulent- barrier to opposition victories. 
 
 
 
 
 
Most analysts have attributed the surprisingly large PRI vote to fear or basic 
conservatism. These two ascribed motives share some similarities, but also show 
important distinctions. The fear vote in 1994 was equated with a rejection of 
violence, disorder, postelectoral conflict, radicalism, and the guerrilla war in Chiapas. 
In contrast, the conservative vote was seen as an embrace of the status quo and a 
desire to maintain Salinas's policies.  
 
The analyst Mauricio Merino provides a more detailed schema of Zedillo votes 
(Merino 1994, 17-19). In addition to those motives, Merino believes that a number of 
votes were influenced by the mass media: voters with little education or political 
knowledge who were swayed by the pro- PRI media. Furthermore, he identifies a 
corporate vote: those who, through their membership in organizations with PRI 
affiliation, were persuaded to vote for Zedillo for promised rewards or punishments. 
A final category is the fraudulent votes: votes that corresponded not to particular 
voters but to "electoral alchemy" by PRI officials. While Merino asserts that electoral 
reforms probably limited the last category of votes, he maintains that the relative 
distribution of the other categories is difficult to ascertain. This is significant because 
mass media-influenced votes and corporate votes clearly reflect an unfair advantage 
enjoyed by the PRI over the other political parties.  
 
Specific information concerning voters' motives-as opposed to opinions about why 
people voted for Zedillo-must come from the voters themselves. Exit polls provide 
some insight into voter preferences. Table 4 offers information about the presidential 
candidates' perceived attributes. Voters were shown a list of characteristics and 
asked which ones corresponded to their perceptions about the candidate for whom 
they had just voted. Overall, PRI voters tended to ascribe more qualities to their 
candidate than non-PRI voters ascribed to theirs. Furthermore, the main attribute 
that the PRI voters associated with Zedillo apparently was experience. Such 
perceptions would have been likely to contribute to a conservative vote for Zedillo; 
those who approved of the status quo would, of course, be more inclined to vote for 
a candidate with perceived experience in the execution of desired policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 provides information specifically about voters' motives. Persons exiting 
voting precincts were offered four choices to indicate why they had voted for their 
candidate:  
* Because the PRI continues to be the best option.  
* Better the devil you know than an unknown good. 
* I voted for the opposition to manifest my discontent.  
* I wanted the opposition to win because the PRI has been in power too long. 
 
This exit poll implies that voters had more of a positive reason to vote for Zedillo (PRI 
is the best option) than a negative reason (fear of the unknown). This would seem to 
suggest that many voters had active reasons to vote for the PRI candidate, despite 
the opinion of many analysts. 
 
A logistic regression of exit poll responses seems to confirm that the Zedillo voters 
fell more into the conservative group than the fear group. Table 6 provides an 
evaluation of five different independent variables and measures their importance in 
determining voting behavior: gender, age, education, perceptions about the 
economy, and approval of Salinas. Negative figures signify a negative correlation; 
correspondingly, positive figures indicate a positive correlation. 
 
 
 
 
 
The only statistically significant results were those connected with approval of 
Salinas and assessment of the economy. For PRI voters, the most important factor 
influencing their vote was their approval of Salinas. Those who viewed the Salinas 
administration positively were most likely to vote for Zedillo. Other factors, such as 
age, education, and socioeco- nomic status, did not seem to play as large a role. 
Conversely, perceptions about the Salinas administration, the state of the national 
economy, and personal economic well-being appear to be the best indicators of 
opposition voting. Of course, as the exit poll did not specifically ask about fear of 
violence or disorder, the fear factor cannot be accurately measured. 
 
Thus, the last two tables seem to suggest that the conservative vote might have 
been quite substantial. That is, many of those who voted (in free and fair elections) 
for Zedillo did so because of their perceptions about the state of the economy and 
the success of the Salinas project. As subsequent events revealed, these 
perceptions were built largely on a false foundation. After the election, the December 
1994 devaluation of the peso raised suggestions that the government was 
manipulating foreign reserves to maintain a false peso-dollar ratio and to stimulate 
cheap imports. Later investigations unveiled fraud underlying many privatization 
sales; close friends of the Salinas administration gained unfair advantage in the 
purchase of national assets, thereby hurting the national economy in the long run 
(Celarier 1997; Wheat 1996). Unsavory and questionable aspects of the Salinas 
administration and the state of the economy were unknown to the voters when they 
made their decision. The lack of equal media access, the absence of financial 
accountability, and other non-election day elements created a climate favorable to 
Zedillo. Crude fraud-that which the electoral reforms focused on-did not occur, but 
complete electoral equality and transparency did not exist, either. 
 
COMPARING THE 1988 AND 1994 RESULTS  
 
Besides understanding who voted for Zedillo and why, a complete analysis of the 
1994 elections must also include a comparison with the election results of 1988. 
Although the ultimate result was the same, the information in table 7 suggests 
important differences in the two electoral outcomes by comparing the relative 
success of each party across the nation. 
 
In 1994 the PRI greatly improved its standing over 1988, winning first place in all the 
states and Mexico City. This result followed electoral trends seen in the 1991 
Chamber of Deputies elections, when the PRI gained votes compared to the 1988 
election. The PAN was also apparently a gainer in comparison to 1988: its standing 
as the second political force increased by 14 states. In contrast, the 1994 elections 
signaled a decline for the PRD. Unlike its tremendous showing in 1988 (under the 
banner of the Frente Democratica Nacional, FDN), in 1994 the PRD failed to win any 
state outright; and its position as the strongest opposition party disappeared in 9 
states. 
 
State election results reveal that the PRI had a poorer showing (in terms of 
percentage of votes) in only one state, Chiapas. The PAN increased its percentage 
of votes in every state and Mexico City, averaging a gain of 289.1 percent over its 
1988 votes. In contrast, the PRD lost votes in 15 states and Mexico City (Mendez 
and Bolivar 1995, 54).  
 
Thus, while the PRI maintained power, the political landscape did change. The PAN 
emerged as the dominant opposition party, and the PRD suffered setbacks across 
the nation. This dramatic transformation in the PRD's role may not be attributable at 
all to the electoral reforms of 1994; instead it may reflect government propaganda 
against the PRD, public association of the PRD with the EZLN, poor campaigning by 
the PRD, or voters' rejection of PRD tactics and policies. Furthermore, the period 
between 1988 and 1994 saw a number of damaging divisions and quarrels erupt 
within the PRD. While the PAN also had its share of internal fragmentation, 
state-level victories and internal party cohesion helped to strengthen it during 
Salinas's sexenio.  
 
It would be wrong, however, to look to the election results of 1994 and predict a 
move toward two-party electoral competition between the PAN and the PRI. As 
analysts have noted (e.g., Klesner 1995), Mexico is evolving into a more complicated 
electoral alignment. While the fortunes of the PRD declined relative to its 1988 
performance, the PRD is still a strong force in electoral politics. The 1994 election 
results (and those of subsequent elections) do suggest that the PAN and the PRD 
offer a strong challenge to the PRI in different regions of the country. The PAN 
provides the strongest opposition in the north, while the PRD is the major contender 
in central Mexico (for example, in the State of Mexico). 
 
 
 
 
Assessing the 1994 results offers an opportunity to evaluate the dynamic relationship 
between electoral reform and election results. Clearly, electoral reform opens the 
door for opposition party victories. These victories, in turn, can stimulate further 
electoral reform; as the number and importance of opposition leaders increases, 
their ability to challenge and change the system increases. The resulting reform then 
further strengthens the potential for even more dramatic election results and 
opposition victories. Thus, democratization rests on both electoral reform and 
election results: Mexico enhances its democratic character as the rules governing 
elections improve and the opposition victories increase.  
 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1994 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 
A detailed analysis of the Mexican presidential election of 1994 illuminates many 
aspects that a simple fixation on the outcome-yet another PRI victory-may hide. As 
this study has demonstrated, this election teaches three significant lessons. First, the 
election undermined several myths about the Mexican political system. Second, it 
highlighted the unconven- tional nature of Mexican democratization (as compared to 
other countries). And third, it underscored the importance of electoral context as well 
as election day behavior in the quest for free and fair elections. For years, certain 
"truths" had underscored assessments about Mexican politics. These assertions 
guided interpretations about the char- acter of Mexican politics and the possibility of 
reform; yet the 1994 presidential election challenged these assumptions. Seven of 
the most important are the following. 
 
*Abstentionism favored the PRI. About 70 percent of the Mexican electorate 
voted, and the PRI won. 
 
* If given a chance, the Mexican public would reject the PRI because 
they were tired of one-party domination. While prob- lems remain, the 
public was given an opportunity to choose. For various reasons, 50.18 
percent chose the PRI and a continuation of one-party domination.  
 
* If given a real alternative, voters would forsake the PRI. As table 3 
demonstrates, the PRI was able to hold on to voters despite genuine electoral 
choices. This suggests that PRI party affiliation may be meaningful for a 
number of voters.  
 
* Electoral credibility in Mexico rests on a PRI loss. That is, people believe 
elections are free and fair only when the PRI loses. Most observers, analysts, 
and the Mexican public agreed that the presidential election of 1994 was-for 
the most part-fair and free on election day; and the PRI won.  
 
* The traumatic events of 1994 would lead to a rejection of the PRI. This 
"myth" persisted because the party's one sure claim, political stability, had 
been destroyed. The fear vote suggests that political trauma may have 
benefited rather than hurt the PRI because voters believed that a continuation 
of PRI government might signal less upheaval.  
 
* The strongest national opponent of the PRI was the PRD. As the 
comparison between 1988 and 1994 shows, the PRD lost national momentum 
in the 1994 election. The PAN, mirroring its state-level advances, moved into 
position as the main national-level opponent of the PRI. Overall assessment 
of election results reveals, however, that the PRI faced significant opposition 
from both parties-in different regions of the country.  
 
* The PRI wins through ballot box fraud. While some election day 
irregularities were reported-271 by the Alianza Civica-the con- duct of the 
election was by all accounts the fairest in contemporary history. The 1994 
election proves, though, that the political environ- ment, including restricted 
media access and the absence of financial accountability, was a key to PRI 
victories. 
 
The August 1994 election proved all of these truisms false-on the national level. Yet 
this does not mean that these assumptions about Mexican politics are entirely 
invalid. The 1995 state elections in Tabasco and Yucatan suggest that these tenets 
may continue to apply at the state level.4 There, competition is high, ballot box fraud 
is not rare, and extralegal electoral activity continues. The traditional fight against 
election day alchemy, it would appear, persists at the state level. Indeed, one of the 
key implications of the 1994 election may be that the dynamics of national- level and 
state-level elections in Mexico differ in important ways. 
 
This leads to the second lesson derived from the 1994 presidential election. Mexican 
democratization does not appear to follow the pattern observed in other Latin 
American cases. Scholars must change their understanding (or use) of the concept 
of political transition in reference to the Mexican case. For the most part, a political 
transition is perceived as a sudden, dramatic change in regime type. This is normally 
signaled by change in the executive office at the national level (see, e.g., Schmitter 
and O'Donnell 1986; Schmitter 1995). Mexico is unique: its transition-if the same 
word may be used-is proceeding very slowly and is occurring, for the most part, at 
the state level. Victories by opposition parties continue to take place in municipal and 
state governments. These victories are fundamentally altering the political terrain of 
Mexico, enhancing democ- racy and pushing the overall system toward regime 
democratization. Electoral reform helps ensure that electoral competition is genuine, 
thereby enhancing the prospects for opposition victory. As opposition leaders win 
more state offices, the power, prestige, and resources of the opposition parties 
increase, thereby aiding the parties in their national- level struggle.  
 
Scholarly attention to Mexican democratization has focused on the presidential 
contest. This largely reflects the importance of the office in Mexico's regime 
ofpresidencialismo (see, e.g., Cothran 1994). The system will never change, goes 
the conventional wisdom, until the dominant political office-the presidency-is won by 
the opposition. Events in Mexico suggest, though, that the presidency may be 
captured only when- because of state-level victories-the office loses its predominant 
extralegal role.5 This change, combined with the augmented resources and power 
gained by state-level victories, means that an opposition victory in the presidency 
may mark not the beginning of a true transformation of the political system and an 
end to presidencialismo but rather the end of such a process.  
 
As more attention focuses on the state level, a better understanding of the dynamics 
of Mexican democratization emerges. The importance of party organization, political 
resources, campaign financing, and local-level bosses emerges. Furthermore, 
increased state and local electoral compe- tition has dramatically heightened 
divisions within the PRI between reformers and old-style politicians, setting the stage 
for an unraveling of the official party-a key component in the regime's power base. 
For many political observers, the Zedillo victory implies that Mexican democratization 
must wait until the year 2000. The process, however, is ongoing. Victories at the 
state level (confirmed by subsequent PAN victories in Jalisco, Baja California Norte, 
Chihuahua, and other states, as well as electoral problems in Tabasco and Chiapas) 
contribute significantly to Mexican democratization. The reforms of 1994, while 
insufficient, did move Mexico closer to an operational democracy in terms of election 
day behavior. The flaws in the reforms, moreover, provide valuable lessons for 
proponents of democracy as well as students of democratization. 
 
The third and final lesson to be learned from the 1994 Mexican presidential election 
is that many factors contribute to democratization. Focusing on a single obstacle to 
democracy-such as ballot box fraud- may obscure the realities underpinning 
nondemocratic governments. Efforts to further electoral reform in Mexico following 
the 1994 contest reveal that democratization activists noted this lesson. In 1996, 
negotiations between the government and opposition forces resulted in an 
agreement that called for increased television time for opposition parties, tighter 
controls on campaign spending, and an end to government control over the IFE. 
When submitted to the legislature, however, the sweeping reform bill was weakened. 
The use of district-level nongovernmental workers to oversee elections was 
postponed until 1998, and the sanctions for violating campaign financing laws were 
reduced. Thus, while attempts were made to reform the electoral context, these 
important changes were challenged. The battle for democratization shifted-but the 
fight continues. 
 
This final lesson may be useful to other countries undergoing democratic transitions 
and consolidations. The experience of Mexico demonstrates that issues such as 
campaign financing, media access, manipulation of information, and control over 
public resources must be addressed if progress toward democracy is to take place. 
Reforms in these areas, though in many ways more complex than ballot box 
security, mark a deepening of the process of democratization. Creating conditions in 
which citizens exercise free choice in the democratic selection of leaders demands 
more than preventing fraud on election day. 
 
 
 
 
Notes  
 
1. Pronasol and Procampo are two government programs that disburse money to 
citizens. Pronasol grants money to local groups to finance improvement projects, 
which can range from roads to sewers to schools. Procampo has an agrarian 
emphasis; it distributes land and money from the national government to 
campesinos. 
 
 2. It was revealed in June 1995 that the PRI candidate for governor, Roberto 
Madrazo Pintado, spent about US$70 million on his campaign, approximately 60 
times the amount allowed by Mexican law. See, e.g., LaJornada 1995b; Juarez 
1995.  
 
3. It has been suggested that a needed devaluation of the Mexican peso was 
postponed until after the 1994 election so as to avoid an economic slowdown that 
would have hurt the PRI's electoral chances. See Whitt 1996; Ros 1995.  
 
4. Like the charges about overspending in the Tabasco election, complaints about 
ballot stuffing and voter fraud arose when the PRI defeated the PAN in statewide 
elections in the Yucatan. See La Jornada 1995a. 
 
5. For instance, pressure is increasing on the executive to release control of tax 
revenue to the states. This challenge to the fiscal power of the presidency is 
spearheaded by opposition governors (Black 1997). 
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